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INTRODUCTION 
 Children born with ambiguous genitalia or with an intersex chromosomal condition are 
born into a society that is ill-equipped and ill-prepared to protect and care for them. Medical 
literature discussing how to approach intersex children has reinforced the social trepidation 
surrounding them, creating a medical phobia and leaving intersex children with underutilized 
legal protections.  
The text of an oft cited medical treatise from 1969 reveals the early social and medical 
view of children born with intersex conditions.1 “To visualize individuals who properly belong 
neither to one sex nor to the other is to imagine freaks, misfits, curiosities, rejected by society 
and condemned to solitary existence of neglect and frustration. Few of these unfortunate people 
meet with tolerance and understanding . . . and fewer still find even limited acceptance.”2 The 
treatise goes on to suggest treatment be started as soon as possible after birth so the children can 
                                                 
1 See CHRISTOPHER J. DEWHURST & RONALD R. GORDON, THE INTERSEXUAL DISORDERS vii (1996); Laura Hermer, 
Paradigms Revised: Intersex Children, Bioethics & the Law, 11 ANNALS HEALTH L. 195, 209 (2002).  
2 Dewhurst, supra note 1, at vii.  
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lead “well adjusted” and in some instances “normal” lives.3 “Treatment” consisted of sex 
assignment or sex normalization surgeries before the child reached the age of two, combined 
with raising the child in strict adherence with the designated sex.4 Furthermore, it was considered 
best to keep the child’s condition secret so as not to interfere with or confuse the gender 
assignment.5 
Only the rhetoric has changed. In 2000, the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) 
Committee on Genetics released a report which called the birth of an intersex child a “social 
emergency.”6 Though the AAP set forth guidelines for determining the sex of rearing depending 
on the child’s circumstance, sex assignment or normalization surgeries are still recommended 
before the child is two, usually between six and eighteen months.7 
Sex assignment and normalization surgeries preformed on infants have significant 
consequences for the children once they reach adulthood. The surgeries produce considerable 
scarring and frequently result in diminished sexual sensitivity.8 A significant number of children 
who receive the surgeries as infants later reject their assigned gender, sex or both.9 Since tissue 
which could be used for sex assignment surgeries later in life is removed during the procedures 
sex reassignment surgeries are rendered onerous at best.10  
Existing informed consent rules are underutilized and improperly applied because of 
social trepidation toward intersex individuals and unwarranted medical urgency to “correct” the 
problem. Nevertheless, the current rules of informed consent are adequate to protect the rights of 
                                                 
3 Id.  
4 See Hermer, supra note 1, at 196, 208.  
5 See id. at 197, 229.  
6 American Academy of Pediatrics, Evaluation of the Newborn with Developmental Anomalies of the External 
Genitalia, 106 PEDIATRICS 138, 138 (2000) available at 
http://aappolicy.aappublications.org/cgi/reprint/pediatrics;106/1/138.pdf. [hereinafter AAP]. 
7 Id., at 138.  
8 See Hermer, supra note 1, at 214.  
9 Id. See also infra Part II. 
10 Id.  
 3
individuals born with intersex conditions, if they are consistently and strictly applied. The rules 
of informed consent, particularly the requirement of a best interest analysis for minors, can 
alleviate many of the complex circumstances created by the current medical treatment of intersex 
minors. The best interest analysis, if enforced, would ensure that parents receive unabridged 
information, would provided a check on the parents’ authority if their interests conflict with 
those of their child, and would take into account the child’s preference, manifest through 
behavior and counseling as the child ages, assuring that sex assignment and normalization 
surgeries are not performed until or unless it is in the child’s best interest.  
Part I of this Article will discuss how the practice of performing sex assignment surgery 
soon after birth developed. Part II will explore the outcomes and consequences of sex assignment 
surgeries performed on intersex infants and minors. Part III will describe existing informed 
consent rules and how they are currently applied to intersex minors. Finally, Part IV will explain 
how application of informed consent is preferable to other theories offered to solve the dilemma 
of infant and minor sex assignment and normalization surgeries, and how the rules of informed 
consent ought to be applied to intersex minors.   
I.  DECEPTIVE RESEARCH CREATES A MEDICAL STANDARD OF INTERSEX INFANT SEX 
ASSIGNMENT AND NORMALIZATION SURGERY  
 
Physicians are obligated to maintain the applicable medical standards of care when 
treating patients.11 The medical standard of care is determined in each jurisdiction based on 
similar medical practitioners in the field in either a local, "like community," state, national, or 
other standard.12 For children born with ambiguous genitalia or children who suffer traumatic 
                                                 
11 See Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Standard of Care Owed to Patient by Medical Specialist as Determined by Local, 
“Like Community,” State, National, or Other Standards, 18 A.L.R. 4th 603 (1982 supp. west 2007); Quijano v. 
United States, 325 F. 3d 504, 567-68 (Tex 2003).  
12 See Perry v. Magic Valley Reg’l Med. Ctr., 995 P. 2d 816 (Idaho 2000) (local standard); Hylick v. Halweil, 492 
N.Y.S.2d 57 (1985) (same); Rann v. Twitchell, 71 A. 1045 (Vt. 1906) (same); Ives . Redford, 252 S.E. 2d 315 (Va. 
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injuries to their genitalia as infants a national standard for medical treatment exists: surgery. This 
standard was theorized and disseminated by one individual, Dr. John Money.13 He has dominated 
this field of medical science following a single experiment on a set of twins.14 Shortly after birth, 
the identical twin boys underwent circumcision procedures; a botched procedure resulted in the 
dismemberment of one of the eight month old boys (David Reimer), while the other came 
through the procedure normally.15 Dr. Money consulted and convinced the parents it would be in 
David’s best interest to be surgically reassigned as a female.16 The parents recalled being rushed 
by Dr. Money to make the decision to surgically assign their son as a female because, as Dr. 
Money put it, there was a short window of opportunity; they recalled Dr. Money even accused 
them of procrastinating.17 He also advised the parents that David’s medical history ought to be 
                                                                                                                                                             
1979) (like community standard); Thompson v. Lockert, 237 S.E. 2d 259 (NC. App. 1977) (same); Quijano 325 F. 
3d at 568 (same); Vasquez v. Hunter, 588 P.2d 326 (Ariz. App. 1978) (state standard); Powers v. U.S. 589 F. Supp. 
1084 (D. Conn. 1984) (same); Ketchum v. Ward, 422 F. Supp. 934 W.D.N.Y. 1976) (national standard); Naccarato 
v. Grob, 180 N.W.2d 788 (Mich. 1910) (same); see also Zitter, supra note 11.  
13 Dr. John Money is a psychologist at Johns Hopkins’ Hospital. See Hazel Glenn Beh & Milton Diamond, An 
Emerging Ethical and Medical Dilemma: Should Physicians Perform Sex Assignment surgery on Infants with 
Ambiguous Genitalia? 7  MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 6 (2000-2001) [HEREINAFTER Beh & Diamond, Emerging 
Dilemma]. Social concern to limit the sexes to two easily definable classes, male and female, existed long before the 
frenzy to perform surgery at infancy. See ALICE DOMURAT DREGER, A History of Intersex: From the Age of Gonads 
to the Age of Consent, in INTERSEX IN THE AGE OF ETHICS 6-12 (Alice Domurat Dreger ed. 1999) [hereinafter 
Dreger, A History of Intersex]. Early sex determinations of sex were made on a strict basis depending on the gonads 
of the individual, irregardless of any external characteristics or behaviors. Id. at 6-9. This was based in the belief of a 
scientific definition of sex and social need for each individual body to contain only one sex; doctors were the ones to 
determine that sex. Id. Then, Blair Bell introduced a revolutionary idea, that while there was one “true sex” for each 
individual, it was not based on anatomical nature alone and surgery could be utilized to “help it along, by 
eliminating any sexually ‘anomalous’ characteristics.” Id. at 10-11. It is noteworthy that doctors, not the individuals, 
decided which sex was the obvious “true sex.” Blair paved the way for Money’s theories to be easily digested by the 
medical community. 
14 Almost every piece of literature regarding the treatment of intersex individuals was either authored or coauthored 
by Dr. Money for nearly thirty years following the 1972 publication of this case. SUZANNE J. KESSLER, LESSONS 
FROM THE INTERSEXED 15, 136 n.10 (1998) [hereinafter Kessler, Lessons] (discussing Money’s unchallenged 
dominance); see also ALICE DOMURAT DREGER, HERMAPHRODITES AND THE MEDICAL INVENTION OF SEX 181-82 
(1998) [hereinafter Dreger, Medical Invention of Sex] (discussing Money’s dominance); Beh & Diamond, supra 
note 15, at 19, n.81 (same). 
15 Beh & Diamond, Emerging Dilemma, supra note 13, at 6.  
16 Id.   
17 Hazel Glen Beh & Milton Diamond, David Reimer’s Legacy: Limiting Parental Discretion, 12 CARDOZO J. L. & 
GENDER 3, 9 (2005-2006) [hereinafter Beh & Diamond, Limiting Parental Discretion].  
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kept secret from him, and directed the parents to move far away and establish a new life in order 
to preserve the secret.18  
In 1972, Dr. Money composed the results of his study of the twins, and declared to the 
world that David was successfully being raised as a girl and demonstrated only some “tomboyish 
traits.”19 He used this one experiment to confirm his theory that infants are sexually neutral and 
adapt to the sex they are reared as; therefore, it makes no appreciable difference if a child is 
raised as a boy or a girl.20 Dr. Money never performed a control group study to support his 
theories or his reported results from the original experiment.21 
Facilitated by his research in the case discussed above, Dr. Money established a series of 
standards for determining when a child’s sex ought to be assigned and which sex should be 
assigned. His first approach was based entirely on the premise that infants are sexually neutral at 
birth; he encouraged surgery and suggested the surgeons assign whichever sexual characteristics 
                                                 
18 Beh & Diamond, Emerging Dilemma, supra note 13, at 7.  
19 Id. at 8.  Money’s theory is based off of the Victorian philosophy that each individual has one true sex. See supra 
note 13 and accompanying text. However, the Victorian philosophy is based on the belief that sex and sexual 
identity is a product of nature; Money’s theory placed the creation of sex and sexual identity as a production of 
nurture. Dreger, A History of Intersex, supra note 13, at 11. Money put forth the theory that any child can be made 
“either gender as long as you make the sexual anatomy reasonably believable.” Id. (emphasis added). Money did 
however hold to the Victorian belief that there is only one true sex, a hermaphroditic identity cannot exist, and that 
the doctors should be the ones to determine the individual’s sexual identity. Id. at 12.    
20 Beh & Diamond, Emerging Dilemma, supra note 13, at 18. There are three types of medical treatments, 
experimental treatment, innovative treatment, and standard care treatment. Id. at 12-16. Experiments are used to test 
new theories and hypotheses on patients. Id. at 12-13. Innovative treatment is not a standard of care, but is treatment 
that has not been tested to create a ‘reasonable expectation of success” and has “unknown risks,” but its intended use 
is solely to “enhance the well being of the patient.” Id. at 13. Once a procedure is accepted by the medical 
community it becomes a “standard procedure” and the standard of care for that particular medical treatment. Id. at 
14-16.  
21 Id. at 19. However, it is important to note that many, possibly a majority of, innovative treatments are accepted by 
the medical community as standard procedures without testing in control groups for efficacy. Id. at 14; see also 
David H. Spodick, The Surgical Mystique and the Double Standard, 85 AMERICAN HEART J. (1973) (Spodick found 
that around 50% of most treatments in his study were studied with control groups and that none of the surgical 
treatment in his study were studied with control groups before becoming standard procedures); Nancy M.P. King & 
Gail Henderson, Treatment of Last Resort: Informed Consent and the Diffusion of New Technology, 42 MERCER L. 
REV. 1007 (1991); David A. Grimes, Technology Follies: The Uncritical Acceptance of Medical Innovation, 269 
JAMA 3030 (1993). 
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were easiest to surgically implement.22 Dr. Money’s theory has altered only marginally through 
the passage of time; he continues to advocate surgery to assign sex before the age of two.23 He 
set forth eight criteria, in order of importance, to consider when deciding which sex to assign an 
infant: 1) genetic or chromosomal sex; 2) gonadal sex (testes or ovaries); 3) internal morphologic 
sex (vesicles/prostate or vagina/uterus/fallopian tubes); 4) external morphologic sex 
(penis/scrotum or clitoris/labia); 5) hormonal sex (androgen or estrogen) 6) phenotypic sex 
(facial hair or breasts); 7) gender of rearing; and 8) sexual identity. 24 As a result of Dr. Money’s 
command over the literature regarding treatment of intersex infants surgery was quickly accepted 
by the medical community as the standard of care.25  
In 1994, Drs. Milton Diamond and Hazel Glen Beh, longtime critics of Dr. Money, 
located the “boy who was made a girl;” he had been lost to follow up for three decades.26 David 
had rejected the assigned sex and was living as an adult male married to a woman and raising her 
two children.27 Furthermore, he explained that “his childhood experiences were not as positive as 
first reported.”28 Drs. Diamond and Beh published these findings in 1997; Dr. Money continues 
                                                 
22 Beh & Diamond, Emerging Dilemma, supra note 13, at 18. The construction of functioning female genitalia was 
far easier then male so that was the preferred or suggested treatment in most cases. Id. at 16, n.68. If an infant was 
born with a micropenis, it was transformed into a clitoris and a vagina was constructed; likewise if an infant was 
born with a clitoris that was too large it was reconstructed regardless of the effect it had on sensitivity. Id. at 18-21. 
See also Alice Domurat Dreger, “Ambiguous Sex” – or Ambivalent Medicine? Ethical Issues in the Treatment of 
Intersexuality HASTINGS GENTER REP. May-June 1999 at 29 (discussing the decision to surgically assign infants as 
girls because an insensitive hole can easily be constructed in anyone). 
23 See JOHN MONEY, SEX ERRORS OF THE BODY AND RELATED SYNDROMES: A GUIDE TO COUNSELING CHILDREN, 
ADOLESCENTS AND THEIR FAMILIES (2d ed. 1994); Julie A. Greenberg, Defining Male and Female: Intersexuality 
and the Collision Between Law and Biology 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 265, 278 (1999) [HEREINAFTER Greenberg, Defining 
Male and Female].  
24 See MONEY supra note 23, at 4; Greenberg, Defining Male and Female, supra note 23, at 278.  
25 Beh & Diamond, Emerging Dilemma, supra note 13, at 17-18; see also note 14 and accompanying text.  
26 Beh & Diamond, Emerging Dilemma, supra note 13, at 9-10.  
27 Id. at 10.  
28 Id. He refused to play with girl toys as a child, stood to urinate, the girls at school would refuse to allow him into 
the bathroom and he would use the boys’ room instead, he refused to take his hormone supplements to facilitate 
female characteristics, at age thirteen he ran away from therapy and refused to go thereafter, and he often 
contemplated suicide. Id. at 9-12. At the age of fourteen, he began to believe he was a boy and on his own initiative 
began living as a boy. Id. Finally, his father told him the truth about his medical history, he underwent a sex-
reassignment surgery. Id. 
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to defend his research.29 Further follow up revealed David committed suicide in 2004, at the age 
of 38.30 
As long as surgery remains the standard of care intersex individuals who have scarring, 
loss of sexual sensation, or who reject their assigned sex have the utmost difficulty proving 
negligence for a medical malpractice suit against physicians. This is because the physicians did 
not violate the medical standard of care by choosing to perform the surgery.31 Prior to Dr. 
Money’s facilitation of surgery as a standard of care, a study was done on 250 intersex 
individuals unaltered by surgical procedures.32 The study found the individuals were not living as 
“freaks, misfits or curiosities,” but rather they had adjusted, integrated into society, and were 
leading relatively normal lives with sexual fulfillment.33 
Not a great deal has changed since 1994 when the accurate results of the legendary “boy 
who was made a girl” were first published. Scholars continued to rely on Dr. Money’s eight 
factors for determining which sex to assign.34 In more recent years, the AAP has developed new 
criteria for determining which sex to assign.35 Though the rhetoric has changed, the new criteria 
are remarkably similar to Dr. Money’s old standards and surgery is still recommended before age 
two.36   
 
                                                 
29Id. at 9 n. 32.  
30 Beh & Diamond, Limiting Parental Discretion, supra note 17, at 12 
31 See Hermer, supra note 1, at 215; see also 18 A.L.R. 4th 603 (“standard of care owed to patient by medical 
specialist as determined by local, state, national, or other standards”). 
32 This study was performed sometime prior to 1952 but, for some unknown reason, was left unpublished in 
professional literature. See Beh & Diamond, Emerging Dilemma, supra note 13, at 24 n.103; JOHN COLAPINTO, AS 
NATURE MADE HIM: THE BOY WHO WAS RAISED AS A GIRL 233, 235 (2000).  
33 See Beh & Diamond, Emerging Dilemma, supra note 13, at 24 n.103; COLAPINTO, supra note 32 at 235; Milton 
Diamond & H. Keith Sigmundson,  Management of Intersexuality: Guidelines for Dealing with Persons with 
Ambiguous Genitalia, 151 ARCHIVES PEDIATRIC ADOLESCENT MED. 1014, 1049 (1997); but cf. note 2 and 
accompanying text.  
34 See, e.g. Greenberg, Defining Male and Female, supra note 23, at 278. 
35 See AAP, supra note 6, at 140-41 (1. Fertility potential; 2. Capacity for normal sexual function; 3. Endocrine 
function; 4. Potential for malignant gonadal change; and 5. Testosterone imprinting); Hermer, supra note 1, at 209.  
36 See AAP, supra note 6, at 141.  
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II.  OUTCOMES AND CONSEQUENCES OF INFANT INTERSEX SURGERIES 
Few follow up studies exist evaluating the success or failure of sex assignment surgeries, 
even though an adequate cohort has attained adulthood for feasible completion of a considerable 
number of follow up studies.37 Of the few studies that do exist, the results are not encouraging, 
though many of the studies are incomplete. One study found that fifty-eight percent of the cohort 
demonstrated psychopathology.38 This study also found that fifty-three percent of the cohort 
“assigned as females exhibited ‘deviant’ gender role behavior.”39  
Although the literature may be sparsely populated with studies evaluating the results of 
these surgeries, accounts of individuals who rejected their sex and gender assignments are 
abundant.40 One compelling case, deemed “Jane’s Story” by the media, is a representative 
example. Jane was born with a complete working set of genitalia and internal organs for both 
sexes; this is a much rarer occurrence than a child born with merely ambiguous genitalia.41 
Jane’s parents chose to have Jane’s sex assigned as a boy.42 S/he underwent several surgeries; 
                                                 
37 See Hermer, super note 1, at 212.  
38 Froukje M E Slijper et al., Long-Term Psychological Evaluation of Intersex Children, 27 ARCH. SEX. BEHAVIOR 
125, 134 (1998) (psychopathology included the diagnosis of one or more of the following disorders: depressive 
neurosis; anxiety disorder; selective mutism; sexual disorders; gender identity disorder; oppositional defiant 
disorder; and obsessive compulsive disorder. The mean age for the onset of the psychopathology was 9.8 years old, 
however, not all the children in the cohort had reached this age at the time of the study.); see also Hermer, supra 
note 1, at 212.  
39 Slijper, supra note 38, at 37 (the parameters of “deviant” behavior was not explained). In addition, the study noted 
that the children assigned as boys did not demonstrate deviant gender role behavior, but the study took care to 
mention they were all “fearful and bothered about the smallness of their penis.” Id.: see also Hermer, supra note 1, 
at 212.  
40 See, e.g., Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome Support Group, Jane’s Story: Yes I’m a Girl Too, (Mar. 2004), 
http://www.medhelp.org/ais/stories/jane2.htm [hereinafter Jane’s Story]; Elizabeth Weil, What if It’s Sort of a Boy 
and Sort of a Girl, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2006, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/24/magazine/24intersexkids.html?ex=1164171600&en=1ba49503324c8fe4&ei=5
070; The Cheers Health, An Intersex Case Study: An Interview with Betsy Driver, , 
http://www.thecheers.org/article_428_Intersex-Issues---An-Interview-with-Betsy-Driver.html (last visited Nov. 20, 
2006).  See generally Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome Support Group, http://www.medhelp.org/ais (last visited 
Nov. 20, 2006); Intersex Society of North America, http://www.isna.org (last visited Nov. 20, 2006). 
41 Jane’s Story, supra note 40. Jane’s condition allowed the parents to make a choice of which sex they would prefer 
as both were equally feasible. Id. Jane’s condition was caused when a woman is carrying a set of twins, one male 
one female and the twins merge into one fetus; Jane even has some organs with two sets of DNA. Id.  
42 Id. 
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however, s/he never received an explanation of these surgeries and any questions only resulted in 
a change of subject.43 This left Jane feeling confused yet aware that s/he was different. S/he 
identified as both a male and a female.44 However, any feminine behavior resulted in “immediate 
verbal chastisement,” causing Jane to suppress these feelings during childhood as best s/he 
could.45 Still, s/he remembers crying alone at night thinking: “I am a little boy but I'm a little girl 
too.”46 Today, Jane lives as both, and wishes that s/he was “left alone” as a child.47  
The physical consequences of surgically reconstructing intersex individuals’ genitals can 
be distressing. The goal of surgery is normality of appearance and some functionality;48 
sensation and future pleasure of the individual are not paramount concerns.49 Of the few follow 
up studies that were performed through the late Nineties, success was measured by the 
appearance of the external genitalia.50 These studies revealed that forty-one percent had a “poor 
cosmetic result” requiring further surgery, sixty-six percent had a “poor overall outcome,” and 
                                                 
43 Id. See Eros Corazza, ‘She’ and ‘He’ Politically Correct Pronouns, 111 PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES 173 (2002) 
(discusses the use of the gender neutral s/he to refer to hermaphrodites and in other situations where gender neutral 
pronouns are appropriate).  
44 Jane’s Story, supra note 40.  
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. See also Kessler, Age of Ethic, supra note 13 (contains articles written by several individuals detailing their 
personal stories and how they suffered due to unwanted surgical intervention they were too young to understand or 
voice an opinion in opposition of).  
48 See Beh & Diamond, Emerging Dilemma supra note 13, at 3, 17-21 (stating that medical practice was dictated by 
surgical potential to create normal looking genitalia, and that this desire normally leads to the decision to choose the 
female gender because it was surgically easier).  
49 Id. at 20-21, n.82 (citing William Reiner, Sex Assignment in the Neonate With Intersex or Inadequate Genitalia, 
AM. J. OF DISEASES OF CHILDREN 1004 (Oct. 1999)) (surgery damages the clitoris and greatly reduces the possibility 
of orgasms). 
50 Kessler, Lessons, supra note 14, at 54-55. Little criteria existed for evaluating the relative success of a procedure. 
Id. Kessler, upon review of twelve follow up studies conducted mostly by surgeons of their own patients, found a 
general, albeit vague, standard used. Id. Results are considered excellent if a near normal appearance is obtained; 
satisfactory if they are compatible with life as a female but the glands are enlarged; and unsatisfactory, offensive, 
and an embarrassment if the phallic enlargement is persistent and considered to be inconsistent with female life. Id.  
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ninety-eight percent needed additional surgeries or treatment to “improve cosmetic appearance, 
facilitate tampon use or sexual intercourse.”51  
Loss of sensation appears to be a common and medically accepted side effect of these 
surgeries.52 An early study found only five of twelve subjects, who were rated as having a 
satisfactory appearance, were capable of sexual gratification after testing.53 One unsympathetic 
surgeon displayed this lack of concern for loss of sexual sensation by describing an intersexed 
woman’s genitalia to her as “a couple of centimeters in diameter with no feeling everything else 
is fine.”54 Even more troubling than the reduction of or loss of sensation, the results of one of the 
rare follow up studies found that five of twelve “surgically reduced clitorises had withered and 
died.”55  
Moreover, once surgery assigning a sex is performed on an infant, important tissue is 
removed; therefore any attempt at surgical reassignment at a later date is an onerous task. For 
example, a male child born with a phallus that is considered too small to function for 
conventional heterosexual sex will undergo a feminizing surgery; the phallus is reduced in size 
and the excess tissue is removed to create the appearance of a clitoris.56 In addition, a blind-
ending hole is constructed by removing additional tissue.57 Finally, any existing gonad tissue that 
conflicts with the assigned sex is removed.58 This often results in the child’s reliance on hormone 
                                                 
51 See Hermer, supra note 1, at 213 (citing Sarah M. Creighton et. al., Objective Cosmetic and Anatomical Outcomes 
at Adolescence of Feminizing Surgery for Ambiguous Genitalia Done in Childhood, 358 LANCET 124 (2001).  
52Beh and Diamond, Emerging Dilemma, supra note 15, at 19-21.  
53 See Kessler, Lessons, supra note 14, at 56. Cf. Hermer, supra note 1, at 213 (suggesting that the long-term impact 
of surgical treatment of adult sexual function is unknown). The assertion by Hermer that the long-term affects are 
unknown is either unpersuasive or demonstrates a further problem with follow up research because surgery has been 
the medical standard for over forty years, which would appear to be long enough to determine the long-term affects 
on adult sexual function.   
54 Kessler, Lessons, supra note 14, at 57.  
55 See Beh and Diamond, Emerging Dilemma, supra note 15, at 20 n.85 (citing William Reiner, Sex Assignment in 
the Neonate with Intersex or Inadequate Genitalia Oct. 1999 AM. J. OF DISEASES OF CHILDREN 1044 (1999)).  
56 AAP, supra note 6, at 138.  
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
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replacement treatment.59 Similar surgeries are preformed if the child is born with an intersex 
condition possessing organs of both sexes.60 Not all surgeries are intended to assign a sex; some 
are performed when the infant’s genitals are ambiguous. For instance, if a female is born with a 
clitoris that is too large, a clitorectomy surgery is performed to reduce the size by cutting off the 
tip and refashioning the shape.61  
The most damaging consequence of infant genital surgery appears to be the psychological 
trauma suffered when the truth is discovered, and the feelings of isolation, stigma, and shame 
surrounding the secrecy and silence with which their condition was treated.62 One study found 
that of forty-one subjects, all had their true identity hidden from them and in someway 
discovered the truth for themselves.63 Many of the subjects noted that because the information 
was kept from them it gained greater importance, causing them to question their “sense of self,” 
knowing that something was being withheld but that it was deemed to terrible for them to be 
                                                 
59 Id. See Heidi Walcutt, Time for a Change, in INTERSEX IN THE AGE OF ETHICS 195, 195(Alice Domurat Dreger ed. 
1999) (discussing the high risk of early onset osteoporosis due to the surgical removal of gonads).  
60 AAP, supra note 6, at 138. 
61 Id.; Erin Lloyd, From the Hospital to the Courtroom: A statutory Proposal Recognizing and Protecting the Legal 
Rights of Intersex Children, 12 CARDOZO J. L. & GENDER, 155, 172-75 (2005-2006). The legal consequences for 
those who reject their assigned sex are also unsympathetic in many states. State laws limiting marriage between a 
man and a woman and the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) limit their future potential to marry. See, e.g., 
In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120 (Kan. 2002); Kantaras v. Kantaras, 884 So. 2d 155 (Fla. Ct. App. 2004); 
Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999). See also Julie A. Greenberg, When is a Same-Sex Marriage 
Legal? Full Faith and Credit and Sex Determination 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 289, 297 (2004). See also Defense of 
Marriage Act Pub. L. No. 104-199 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C). As one scholar put it, “when a state 
limits marriage to a union between one man and one woman, they must also determine what makes a man a man and 
what makes a woman a woman.” Greenberg, supra at 291. Some courts rely on chromosomal sex when determining 
the sex of an individual for marriage purposes. Id. This can cause problems for individuals who assigned sex does 
not match their chromosomal makeup. Other states rely on the sex assigned at birth. For example, Texas courts held 
that gender assigned at birth cannot be altered for the purpose of marriage. Id. at 298 However, other courts have 
taken up the issue and held on more scientific grounds that sex was based on the brain function of the individual. Id. 
at 299. Over 80% of states ban same sex marriage either by statute or by constitutional amendment; however, over 
half of the states have enacted legislation permitting amendments to birth certificates to reflect self-identified sex. 
Id. at 291, 281-98; see also, Kavan Peterson, 50 State Rundown on Same-Sex Marriage Laws, available at 
http://www.stateline.org/stateline/?pa=story&sa=showStoryInfo&print=1&id=353058. The result of these 
conflicting state laws is that a marriage valid on one state could result in an illegal heterosexual union in another 
state, which limits mobility of married intersex couples. Greenberg, supra at 292.  
62 Sharon E. Preves, For the Sake of the Children: Destigmatizing Intersexuality, 9 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 411, 414 
(1998). See Hermer, supra note 1, at 214. 
63 Preves, supra note 61, at 414; also available in INTERSEX IN THE AGE OF ETHICS 56 (Alice Domurat Dreger, ed 
1999).  
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informed.64 Dr. Money is adamant that the children’s condition be kept secret from them, in case 
they become confused about the sexual identity that has been assigned them. Dr. Money went so 
far as to convince the Reimer parents not only to keep the boy’s medical history secret from him, 
but to move far away and establish a new life in order to preserve the secret.65   
Should these results and reactions seem too callous, one need only remember the intent of 
the surgery is not to assemble a sexually complete and satisfied member of society. There are 
two more pressing objectives behind the surgeries: 1) to alleviate the “social emergency” caused 
by a sex that is not clearly male or female,66 and 2) to make the child appear physically 
acceptable to the parents.67 Empirical evidence continues to support the belief that “prevailing 
social norms” may have a profound adverse effect on the bond between the infant and its 
parents.68 Even so, more recent studies demonstrate that following the surgeries parents do not 
necessarily have an increased bond with their child.69 One study of parents who received 
counseling found that fifty percent “were not able to work through the trials and tribulations their 
child’s lack of gender clarity entailed.”70 In light of such uncertain results, the rush to neonatal 
surgery seems to warrant a close and informed decision. Though parental attachment and social 
norms may play a role in a decision, the best interest of the child is a consideration that comes 
                                                 
64 Id. at 56-57.  
65 Beh & Diamond, Emerging Dilemma supra note 13, at 7.  
66 See AAP, supra note 6, at 138; supra notes 13, 19 and accompanying text.  
67 Kessler, Lessons, supra note 14, at 55 (noting that the genital surgeries are intended to relieve the anxieties about 
the child with relatives and friends and that it is not uncommon for follow-up reports to “include observations ‘that 
the parents were satisfied with the results of the genital surgery). Kessler also notes that in these early studies done 
by physicians of their own work, the physicians reports are vague and often conclusory without psychological 
support for their conclusions of parental or patient responses. Id. at 53-54.  
68 See Hermer, supra note 1, at 230; Bruce E. Wilson & William G. Reiner, Management of Intersex: A Shifting 
Paradigm, 9 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 360, 365 (1998) (discussing evidence that parents react poorly to children with 
malformed genitalia and morn the loss of their expected perfect child). 
69 Id. at 230-31 (The studies showed that about fifty percent of parents rejected their abnormal child before surgery 
and the numbers did not appear to be any different after surgery).  
70 Slijper, supra note 3838, at 132. Of the twenty-seven couples in counseling for this particular study; two mothers 
and one father openly rejected their child; it was cited as playing an important role in five divorces; two couples had 
constant doubt that the wrong sex had been assigned to their child; and five other couples exhibited symptoms of 
trauma. Id.   
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into play far too infrequently when the decision to perform a sex assignment surgery on an infant 
can have such lasting and, under the wrong circumstances, disastrous consequences.  
III. INFORMED CONSENT AND ITS PREVAILING APPLICATION 
The doctrine of informed consent has existed for only a short time, about fifty years, in 
the American Legal System.71 Informed consent stands for the basic tenet of individual self-
determination, which is so deeply imbedded in American ideology that the “right to be let alone” 
underlies much of American social jurisprudence.72 Justice Cardozo drew on this principle long 
ago. “Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be 
done with his own body.”73 His words have been quoted and used to shape the direction of 
informed consent as an issue of patient self-determination since the landmark case of Canterbury 
v. Spence.74 The informed consent doctrine has evolved into an expansive protection of “the right 
of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or 
interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.”75 The right to be let 
alone includes the right to refuse any treatment – even necessary, life saving treatment.76 This 
doctrine compels doctors to share decision making power with patients and furnish the information 
necessary to make meaningful decisions.77 
 
                                                 
71 See Hermer, supra note 1, at 221 (discussing the development of informed consent).  
72 See ARNOLD J. ROSOFF, INFORMED CONSENT: A GUIDE FOR HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS 1 (1981) (discussing the 
roots of informed consent); JAMES M MORRISSEY, ET. AL., CONSENT AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE HEALTH CARE OF 
CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS 13 (1986) (same). See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-85 (1965) 
(the Court discusses that underlying principal of several constitutional amendments creates a penumbra of privacy – 
a right to be let a lone); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 168 n.2 (1973) (Stewart J., concurring) (discussing the “right to 
be let alone by other people”). 
73 Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129 (1914).  
74 See 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (quoting Schloendorff, 211 N.Y. at 129).   
75 Cruzan v. Mo. Dep’t of Health 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990)  
76 Id. 
77 Id. (an individual of sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his body); see also Hermer, 
supra note 1, at 222 (physicians must share decision making power).  
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A. Informed Consent Modus Operandi  
The doctrine of informed consent is relatively simple in theory, but complicated in 
practice because medicine is often performed under stressful and imperfect circumstances. In 
theory, the doctrine of informed consent requires only two things from physicians before 
performing a medical procedure: 1) the physician must obtain the patient’s consent or the 
consent of a legal guardian, and 2) the consent obtained must be informed.78 Each of the 
individual components of the informed consent doctrine are directed toward allowing the patient 
the broadest right to self-determination possible. 
Informed consent laws are most stringent in the context of surgical procedures. To 
complete the famous words of Justice Cardozo cited above, “a surgeon who performs an 
operation without his patient’s consent commits an assault for which he is liable in damages.”79 
However, consent is not required in emergency situations that “endanger the life or health of the 
patient,” consent is presumed absent evidence to the contrary.80 Ordinarily, consent must be 
expressly granted by the patient; however, under a few special circumstances, consent can be 
presumed when a patient submits to a procedure without objection.81 Physically obtaining 
                                                 
78 See Rosoff, supra note 72, at 3- 59; J.B.G., Consent as Condition of Right to Perform Surgical Operation, 139 
A.L.R. 1370 (1942 west. supp. 2007).  
79 Schloendorff, 211 N.Y. at 129. This principle has been well established in legal precedent. See, e.g., Canterbury v. 
Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (surgery preformed without informed consent is a battery); Wall v. 
Brim, 138 F.2d 478, 481 (5th Cir. 1943) (same); Dunham v. Wright, 423 F.2d, 940 (3d Cir. 1970) (surgery without 
notice of alternative was surgery without informed consent and that is a battery). However, the law is less uniform 
when surgeries and other less invasive procedures are not involved; failure to obtain informed consent is a battery in 
some jurisdictions and in others it is simple negligence. See, e.g., Robinson v. Cutchin, 140 F. Supp. 2d 488 (D. Md. 
2001) (failure to obtain informed consent is negligence); Tinius v. Carrol County Sheriff Dept., 321 F. Supp. 2d 
1064 (N.D. Iowa 2004) (failure to obtain informed consent is battery). 
80 See, e.g., Chambers v. Nottebaum, 96 So. 2d 716, 718  (Fla. App. 1957) (stating the rule regarding exceptions to 
informed consent in emergency situations); Canterbury, 138 F.2d at 788-89 (same); Douget v. Touro, 537 So. 2d 
251, 260 (La. App. 1988) (same); see also Rosoff, supra note 72, at 14-19.  
81 See, e.g., O’Brien v. Cunard S.S. Co., 28 N.E. 266 (Mass 1891) (Ship passenger stood in line for a vaccination, 
was aware that the vaccinations were taking place, and did not object when she was given a vaccination. The court 
determined this was implied consent to the medical services). Note that the facts for implied consent cases are very 
specific and uncommon.  
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consent is not an intricate obligation of informed consent except perhaps in the presences of an 
emergency; the veritable complexity is assuring that consent is truly informed.  
The requirement that consent be actually informed places a duty on physicians to disclose 
necessary information to the patient. The legal field is divided over what standard to apply for 
determining the appropriate amount of information to disclose. The older standard, and currently 
the minority standard, permits the physician to disclose only what a reasonable physician would 
under the circumstances.82 The second and more stringent standard is based on the disclosures a 
reasonable patient would expect to receive.83 Under this standard, the physician must disclose all 
information and risks that would potentially affect the patient’s decision in order to preserve the 
patient’s self-determination and personal control over the decision.84 Although there is no 
specific recitation of exactly what must be disclosed, over the years a partial and uninclusive list 
of important items has developed, including: diagnosis; nature and purpose of treatment; risks 
and consequences; probability of success; feasible alternatives; and prognosis if the treatment is 
not given.85 
Like consent, there is an exception to the rule of disclosure; it is referred to as the 
therapeutic privilege to withhold information. The physician may withhold information that 
might have a physical or psychological impact on the patients’ well being or when the patient is 
incompetent to give consent.86 The courts have noted the need for this exception to be limited for 
fear it would swallow the rule. In order to prevent the exception from swallowing the rule, a 
                                                 
82 See, e.g., Culbertson v. Mernitz, 602 N.E.2d 98, 102-03 (Ind. 1992); see also Hermer, supra note 1, at 222; 
Rossoff, supra note 72, at 34-35.  
83 See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Cooper v. Roberts, 286 A.2d 647 (Pa. Super. 1 see 
also Hermer supra note 1, at 222; Rossoff, supra note 72, at 38-51. 
84 Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 786-87; Matties v. Mastromonaco, 709 A.2d 238, 248 (N.J. Super. 1998); see also, 
Rosoff, supra note 72, at 44-46. 
85 Rosoff, supra note 72, at 41, 41-51; Morrissey, supra note 72, at 14.   
86 Goldberg v. Boone, 912 A.2d 698, 703 (Md. 2006); Ward v. Lutheran Hosp. & Homes Soc., 963 P.2d 1031 
(Alaska 1998). See also Rosoff, supra note 72, at 54-56.  
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physician must use caution when withholding information based on the therapeutic privilege.  
Physicians may not withhold information based on a paternalistic notion that, if divulged, the 
patient would forgo treatment the physician deems necessary.87 Therefore, this narrow exception 
applies only when the physician identifies “specific considerations in the individual patient's 
case” that goes beyond the physician’s decision to withhold a specific medical fact out of the 
belief it will scare patients.88   
B. Application to Minors 
Minors are considered incompetent to consent to medical treatment among other things 
due to their lack of maturity and ability to comprehend the consequences.89 Thus, to perform 
medical procedures on a minor, physicians must obtain consent from the parents or someone 
standing in loco parentis.90 Parents are entitled to all the information provided to the patient 
under the informed consent doctrine explained above.91 In fact, some precedent suggests that 
parents, and others who provide proxy consent, are entitled to more extensive information.92 In 
addition, the therapeutic privilege to withhold information would not apply as there is no fear 
that the information will physically or psychologically harm the patient.93  
Thus, parents, and those acting in loco parentis, have the right to make informed consent 
decisions for minor children, as the children are not permitted to and sometimes unable to consent 
                                                 
87 Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 789; Barcai v. Betwee, 50 P.3d 946, 963 (Haw. 2002). 
88Barcia, 50 P.3d at 963 (referring to Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).  
89 See Willard Gaylin, Who Speaks for the Child?, in WHO SPEAKS FOR THE CHILD: THE PROBLEMS OF PROXY 
CONSENT 3, 14-15 (Willard Gaylin & Ruth Macklin eds. 1982).   
90 Rosoff, supra note 72, at 188; Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (consent of parents is 
required for surgical procedures preformed on minors). Parham v. J.R. 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (“a presumption 
that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for making life's 
difficult decisions”). 
91 Rosoff, supra note 72, at 187.  
92 Id.  See also, Darrah v. Kite, 301 N.Y.S.2d 286, 291-92 (N.Y. 1969) (information provided to parents may have 
been insufficient the case was remanded for this specific determination);  
93 Rosoff, supra note 72, at 187 (therapeutic privilege to withhold information does not apply because there is no fear 
that the information will cause the patient physical or psychological harm); Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 789 (therapeutic 
privilege to withhold information only applies when disclosure would cause the patient to become so ill or 
emotionally distraught as to foreclose rational decision making).  
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for themselves. As one scholar noted, “the obvious purpose is to protect the child from damaging 
the adult he is eventually to become.”94 In order for the parent to reach informed consent 
conclusions, not only is the doctor required to provide the information, but the parent is obligated 
to obtain the necessary information so that decisions can be, and are, made in the child’s best 
interest.95 Within the confines of the child’s best interest the parents’ right to consent or to 
withhold consent is not absolute. When the state determines that the child’s best interest is 
sufficiently in conflict with the parent’s decision it will intervene.96 This is most common when the 
parent refuses necessary medical treatment for a minor for, inter alia, blood transfusions and 
cancer treatments.97  
In most instances, minors, unlike adults, do not have the right to refuse necessary medical 
treatment.98 Thus, anyone providing consent for the minor does not obtain this right by proxy 
because the child never possessed it. Beyond the state interference that may occur when a parent 
                                                 
94 Willard, supra note 89, at 15. See, e.g., Darrah v. Kite, 301 N.Y.S.2d 286, 291-92 (N.Y. 1969) (remanding case to 
find if information parents received when they consented to child’s surgery was sufficient for informed consent).  
95 See Parham, 442 U.S. at 602 (“a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and 
capacity for judgment required for making life's difficult decisions. More important, historically, it has recognized 
that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children”) (emphasis added) Novak v. 
Cobb County Kennestone Hosp. Auth., 849 F. Supp. 1559, 1577 (N.D. Ga. 1994) (“those acting in loco parentis 
have duty to consider best interest of the child”); Jennifer L. Rosato, Using Bioethics Discourse to Determine When 
Parents Should Make Health Care Decisions for their Children: Is Deference Justified?, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 7 
(2000); Hermer, supra note 1, at 222. This standard is the evolution of the view of the parent’s role in their child’s 
life and continues to grow over time. See Morrissey, supra note 72, at 6. This has thus far been a three stage 
evolution. Id. First, children were seen as the property of their parents with no individual constitutional rights; the 
parents were entitled to the obedience and labor of their children and they were also entitled unquestioned control to 
make proxy decisions for their children. Id. at 2-3. In the second stage, parents were responsible for proper 
development of their children; control remained absolute but there was a shift in parenting and the emphasis was on 
producing grown children fit for the community. Id. at 3. The third stage is the child welfare stage, where society 
became concerned with the welfare of the child and decisions must be made in the child’s best interest. Id. at 4. In 
this stage the child still has no say, when the child’s best interest is not looked after the state will intervene. Id. 
However, in more recent developments the best interest of the child has begun to include the opinion of mature 
minors, and minors are granted more and more constitutional rights, yet still not on par with adults. Id. at 4-6.  
96 Gaylin, supra note 89, at 27, 31. 
97 Novak v. Cobb County-Kennestone Hosp. Auth., 849 F. Supp. 1559 (N.D. Ga. 1994) (court ordered a mature 
minor to receive a necessary blood transfusion against the parents’ and minor’s wishes); Hamilton v. McAuliffe, 353 
A.2d 634 (Md. 1976) (same); In re Guardianship of L.S. & H.S., 87 P.3d 521 (Nev. 2004) (same).  
98 See supra note 97 and accompanying text; c.f.  Cruzan v. Mo. Dep’t of Health 497 U.S. 261, 261 (1990) (adults 
may refuse life sustaining nutrients and hydration if that is their clear intent). This rule applies in most instances as 
the courts have begun to recognize expanded rights of “mature minors” allowing them a greater say in medical self-
determination. Rosoff, supra note 72, at 188-90.  
 18
refuses to consent to medical treatment for a minor, there are instances when the interest of the 
minor and the parent may conflict.99 “Although the full measure of constitutional rights has not 
been extended to minors, the assumption that minors have no protection under the Constitution has 
been decisively rebutted.”100 Justice O’Connor took special note of the constitutional rights of 
children in the context of medical treatment in the landmark case Cruzan v. Missouri Department 
of Health stating: “[i]t is not disputed that a child, in common with adults, has a liberty interest in 
not being confined unnecessarily for medical treatment.”101 
The state, in its parens patriae role, interferes in other instances when the medical 
interests of the child may conflict with the interests of the parent in order to preserve the 
constitutional rights of the child against the interests of the parent. In medical situations, the state 
most frequently intervenes during medical emergencies, such as blood transfusions.102 However, 
the state can intervene in non-emergency situations. For instance, several states prohibit the 
sterilization of a child.103 Other states prohibit parents from entering a child into an experimental 
medical program or from consenting to the removal of a child’s organs without a court order.104 
There is no need for a medical emergency threatening the child’s life before the state may 
intervene on behalf of the child.  The state can, and often does, intervene when parents make 
decisions that either harm or expose the child to harm.105  
                                                 
99 Margaret O’Brien Steinfels, Children’s Rights, Parental Rights, Family Privacy, and Family Autonomy, in WHO 
SPEAKS FOR THE CHILD: THE PROBLEMS OF PROXY CONSENT 223, 224 (Willard Gaylin & Ruth Macklin eds. 1982), 
100 Id. at 225 (referencing In re Gault, 875 S. Ct. 1428 (1967); Tinker v. Des Moines Indp. Comty. Sch. Dist., 89 S. 
Ct. 733 (1969); Carey v. Population Serv. Int’l, 97 S. Ct. 2010 (1977); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 96 S. Ct. 
2831 (1976)); see also Parham, 442 U.S. at 600.  
101 497 U.S. 261, 288 (1990) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing Parham, 442 U.S. at 600). 
102 See supra note 97 and accompanying text.  
103 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-49-101-303 (2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-20-3 (2004); N.D. CENT. CODE. § 23-
12-12 (2003). See also Lloyd, supra note 61, at 169.  
104 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-302(A)(1)(A),(C) (2005). See also Lloyd, supra note 6161, at 169. 
105 See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (holding that state could intervene and prevent child 
labor, even if religiously related work, if the state is acting to “guard the general interest in youth’s well being); 
Parham, 442 U.S. at 600-02 (required some due process for minors before they are committed to mental institution 
to assure that parents are motivated by child’s best interest).  
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Thus, it is becoming more and more important to take into account the constitutional 
rights of the child when making decisions that will greatly affect the child. This has led to the 
movement allowing “mature minors” more of a say in medical decisions, particularly when the 
interests of the minor conflict with those of the parent.106 As one scholar noted; “in all areas [of 
life] it is incredible how often children are completely foreclosed from life-binding decisions – 
even when such decisions might easily be deferred until the age of their competence.”107 As this 
statement exemplifies, the recognition of constitutional rights for minors, especially in regards to 
medical care, has created a push not just for consideration of the child’s best interest but for 
consideration of the child’s interests. Here, as in other areas of American Jurisprudence, the 
importance of individual self-determination takes command of the rights of third party decision 
makers.  
C. Current Application to Minors with Intersex Conditions  
Informed consent is applied loosely when it comes to infant and minor genital surgeries. 
Essentially, physicians operate without the constraints of informed consent. This is accomplished 
by treating each intersex birth as a “medical emergency exception” under informed consent and by 
withholding information under the guise of the therapeutic privilege to withhold information 
exception to informed consent.108 In addition, the physicians advise the parents to keep the child’s 
condition a secret from other family members. This advice “isolate(s) parents within the medical 
                                                 
106 Steinfels, supra note 99, at 236-37; Rosoff, supra note 72, at 188-90; Morrissey, supra note 72, at 16. See also, 
e.g., Planned Parenthood 428 U.S. 52, 72-73 (1976) (stating that minor’s cannot be forced to seek parental consent 
in all but emergency situations when seeking abortions a bypass process must be provided); Gulf & S.I.R. Co. v. 
Sullivan, 119 So. 501, 502 (Miss. 1928) (seventeen year old is intelligent enough to understand and therefore 
consent to a vaccination)   
107 Gaylin, supra note 89, at 15. See, e.g., Darrah v. Kite, 301 N.Y.S.2d 286, 291-92 (N.Y. 1969) (remanding case to 
determine if information parents received when they consented to child’s surgery was sufficient for informed 
consent).  
108 See Lloyd, supra note 61, at 155, 172-75 (2005-2006). See supra notes 80, 86-87 and accompanying text.  
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arena since physicians [are] the only ones with whom parents believed they [are] free to discuss the 
condition.”109  
The emergency exception to informed consent is ordinarily reserved for situations that 
“endanger the life or health of the patient.”110 Physicians under the direction of Dr. Money, and 
now the AAP, rely on the fact that a child born with an intersex condition is considered to be a 
“social emergency” to circumvent this “technicality.”111 Continuing with the emergency mentality, 
physicians often express an air of urgency concerning sex assignment and cosmetic genital 
surgeries.112 To further this sense of urgency and demonstrate the “emergency” nature of the 
situation the infants are often isolated in the neonatal intensive care unit immediately after birth 
with an intersex condition, regardless of its life-threatening nature.113 Several rationales have been 
advanced in an effort to explain the urgency; however, little empirical support evaluating the 
validity of these rationales has been produced. Dr. Money advances the theory that surgery “must 
be done in the ‘early months of life’ in the ‘critical period’ or else it would be ‘psychologically 
injurious.’”114 In addition, physicians and psychologists assert the importance of parental bonding 
during the first years of the infant’s life and stress that bonding will be more difficult if a parent is 
not spared the trauma of seeing intersex genitalia every time they change their infant’s diaper.115  
                                                 
109 Beth & Diamond, Limiting Parental Discretion, supra note 17, at 16.  
110 See supra note 80 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Chambers v. Nottebaum, 96 So. 2d 716, 718  (Fla. App. 
1957) (stating the rule regarding exceptions to informed consent in emergency situations); Canterbury, 138 F.2d at 
788-89 (same); Douget v. Touro, 537 So. 2d 251, 260 (La. App. 1988) (same). 
111 See AAP, supra note 6, at 138; Beh & Diamond, Limiting Parental Discretion, supra note 17, at 3, 9 (maintains 
that the use of “monster ethics” allows parents and doctors to ignore sound medical practice in treating intersex 
infants).  
112 See Beh & Diamond, supra note 13, at 43-46; Hermer, supra note 1, at 222; Lloyd, supra note 61, at 172.  
113 See Helena Harmon-Smith, A Mother’s 10 Commandments to Medical Professionals: Treating Intersex in the 
Newborn, in INTERSEX IN THE AGE OF ETHICS 195, 195(Alice Domurat Dreger ed. 1999) (contends that isolating the 
child in the NICU makes parents “feel something is very wrong with there child . . . isolates the family and prevents 
siblings, aunts uncles and even grandparents from visiting).  
114 Beh & Diamond, Limiting Parental Discretion, supra note 17, at 13.  
115 Lloyd, supra note 61, at 173. 
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The therapeutic privilege to withhold information is also misapplied when an infant is born 
with an intersex condition. The medical information provided to parents is often incomplete, 
overstates the potential for success, and understates harmful consequences such as scarring, loss of 
sensation, additional necessary surgeries, and poor aesthetic outcomes.116 In essence, the parent is 
treated as the patient and information the physician believes may upset or embarrass the parent is 
withheld.117 Physicians may also tell parents that the child is sexually unfinished – this is deceptive 
– it “implies that with more gestational time unambiguous sex organs would have developed” and 
that the doctors are not changing the child merely finishing it.118 This also provides parents with 
the false sense that after surgery their infant’s genitals will be normal.119  
This lack of information and rushed atmosphere combined with the emotional experiences 
of the parents does not leave much room for a reasoned consideration of what is in the child’s best 
interest. In addition, one of the foundations of parents’ proxy consent for their minor children is 
“that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children.”120 
Scholars have criticized this theory on the premise that during infancy the parental bonding may 
not be complete and the love assumed by society “may not have yet developed.”121 Furthermore, 
scholars contend the parents are not in the ideal position to make a best interest determination as 
family members often fail to recognize that a child’s interest may evolve and grow with the child 
over time.122 There is also the possibility that the parents are responding to the emotional strain and 
                                                 
116 See Beh & Diamond, Emerging Dilemma, supra note 13, at 47-55; Hermer, supra note 1, at 222-23; Lloyd, 
supra, note 61, at 174 (explains that parents are given information on a “need to know” basis).  
117 Beh & Diamond, Limiting Parental Discretion, supra note17, at 27. See also Lloyd, supra note 61, at 173-75.  
118 Beh & Diamond, Emerging Dilemma supra note 13, at 48. Lloyd, supra note 61, at 174 (stating that telling the 
parents the child is unfinished confuses the malformed genitalia with ambiguous genitalia). 
119 Lloyd, supra note 61, at 175.  
120 Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979). 
121 Lloyd, supra note 61, at 168.  
122 Lloyd, supra note 61, at 169 (notes possible changing interest include sexual orientation, gender identity, and the 
desire to have children).  
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shock of having a child that is not perfect, and parents mourn the loss of their perfect child.123 
During this period of emotional adjustment it would be difficult for parents to make a best interest 
determination for the child under urgent circumstances. Finally, the parents’ interest may be in 
conflict with the overall best interest of the child.124 Parents are often more concerned with the 
appearance of the child’s genitalia to permit a more normal childhood and adolescence.125 The 
parent takes less account of the period when the child becomes an adult and spends less time with 
the parent, in which functionality and sensation may be more important than mere physical 
appearance.126  
Applied in this manner, informed consent laws provide little protection for children born 
with ambiguous genitalia or intersex conditions. Societal trepidation of a sex that is neither male 
nor female obstructs medical decisions and prevents the full realization of the legal protection of 
informed consent laws. The legal principles of informed consent are manipulated to bring about an 
outcome that is more palatable for society regardless of its future effect on the individual, and 
regardless of its destruction of the concept of individual self-determination.  
IV.  INFORMED CONSENT : A RETURN TO THE BEST INTEREST APPROACH  
Existing informed consent rules are underutilized and improperly applied because of 
social trepidation toward intersex individuals and unwarranted medical urgency to “correct” the 
problem. Nevertheless, the current rules of informed consent are adequate to protect the rights of 
individuals born with intersex conditions, if they are consistently and strictly applied. The rules 
of informed consent, particularly the requirement of a best interest analysis for minors, can 
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alleviate many of the complex circumstances created by the current medical treatment of intersex 
minors. The best interest analysis, if enforced, would ensure that parents receive unabridged 
information, would provided a check on the parents’ authority if their interest conflict with those 
of their child, and would take into account the child’s preference manifest through behavior and 
counseling as the child ages, assuring that sex assignment and normalization surgeries are not 
performed until or unless it is in the child’s best interest.  
The doctrine of informed consent is based on individual self-determination. For this 
principle of self-determination to be enforced the legal system will be required to pay close 
attention to physician who encounter intersex minors, and to the parents of these children. 
A.  Scholars Weigh in on Informed Consent’s Potential for Intersex Surgeries  
The combination of pressures placed on parents by physicians and their own emotional 
shock provides little room for reasoned consideration of the child’s best interest under the 
principles of informed consent. However, this is not detrimental to the idea of informed consent. 
If the courts strictly enforce the principles of informed consent on physicians and parents, as it 
does when considering other medical procedures, these kinds of manipulations of the system 
would not be possible. Many scholars do not agree. They fall into two camps: 1) those who argue 
for a complete moratorium on genital surgeries until individuals reach the age of consent, and 2) 
those that argue for continued infant genital surgery with additional information for parents.  
Drs. Milton Diamond and Hazel Glenn Beh, the psychologists who discredited Dr. 
Money’s theories, recommend a moratorium on infant surgeries.127 They suggest that counseling 
should be received and surgery should not be an option until the child reaches adulthood and the 
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intersexed individual can make his or her own decision.128 In addition, they contend that 
providing additional information to parents cannot “legitimize a surgical treatment that lacks a 
therapeutic rational” and poses substantial risk to the patient while offering little benefit.129 This 
proposition presumes that parents will never be able to make decisions in the best interest of their 
children and that a surgery before the child is eighteen will never be in the child’s best interest. It 
is effortless to look at the current application of informed consent principles and contemplate that 
the rules cannot protect this minority population. However, it is not the rules of informed consent 
that are the problem; it is continuing failure of society to enforce them for the protection of a 
minority population that is feared.  
Some scholars argue against the moratorium principle, and in favor of merely providing 
some additional information to parents before they make the decision regarding infant genital 
surgery.130 Their reasoning is that some parents, even after having all information provided to 
them regarding the risks of infant surgery, will “maintain a strong prejudice in favor of 
surgery.”131 They argue that infant genital surgery does not create an “ethical dilemma” because 
the ultimate decision regarding early surgery, like all other major decisions regarding children, 
lies with the parents and “should be made in the context of their own cultural beliefs.” 132 
The fact that the parents may have a “strong prejudice” in favor of surgery indicates that 
they may have a conflict of interest with the child’s best interest. The informed consent 
principles require that the decision maker be able to consider the best interest of the child, if that 
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cannot be done by the decision maker the state, in its parens patriae role, steps in to advocate for 
the best interest of the child.133  
Furthermore, the view that parents should be able to subject their child to genital surgery 
so that the child will conform to the parents’ cultural beliefs contravenes the very idea of 
individual self-determination. This country has gone to great lengths to prevent the mutilation of 
the genitalia of minors based on cultural beliefs or any other unsound reason. In 1996, the 
Criminalization of Female Genital Mutilation Act was enacted.134 It states in pertinent part: 
“[e]xcept as provided in subsection (b), whoever knowingly circumcises, excises, or infibulates 
the whole or any part of the labia majora or labia minora or clitoris of another person who has 
not attained the age of 18 years shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 
years, or both.”135 It remains unclear how the Act applies to those born with intersex conditions; 
the continued legality of the surgeries may depend on the existence of actual medical necessity 
rather than a desire for cosmetic normalization.136 One thing is sure: neither the Act nor informed 
consent principles anticipate legal surgeries for minors based on the parents’ cultural satisfaction 
with their child’s genital appearance.  
One scholar suggests a middle ground is possible, and that increased information from 
physicians to parents would correct the flaws, or at least manage them sufficiently.137 She 
contends that ending infant surgeries will not correct the societal discrimination they will face 
without a sex in an intolerant society.138 She contends that not performing surgery forces parents 
to enter their children into a social experiment, that without the cosmetic appearance the children 
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could not be raised within the current sex and gender system.139 Based on this, she reasons there 
can be no right answer for parents and infant surgery as an option should not be foreclosed.140 
 However, she ignores two realities. First, if the child does not undergo cosmetic surgery 
as an infant the child can still have a sex of rearing. There is no reason the child must be raised 
sexless, or treated as a “freak of nature” that fits nowhere into society simply because the child 
has ambiguous genitalia. The parents can select a gender of rearing, or attempt to raise the child 
in a gender neutral manner until a preferred sex is determined; whichever they ascertain is in 
their child’s best interest. This will depend on the individual condition of each child.  Second, the 
parent in most cases will not and cannot know what gender the child will identify with when the 
child is an infant, and rejection of surgically assigned gender is a real possibility that can have 
lasting and damaging consequences.141 Because the parent cannot know they must make the 
decision based on other factors and it is possible that they will use interests that conflict with 
those of the child to make this decision, such as their own “anxieties, guilt, shame, or 
repugnance.”142 
While all of these reasons may support a moratorium on infant sex assignment surgeries, 
a moratorium is unnecessary to protect the interests of intersex children from the social forces at 
work against them. Strict adherence to all the principles of informed consent has all the 
safeguards necessary to protect these children. However, it will require the cooperation of the 
legal system to enforce the protections of informed consent that these children deserve. For too 
many years the legal system has allowed the medical profession to apply Victorian principles of 
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paternalism to intersexed children and their parents, thereby disregarding all thoughts of 
individual self-determination and informed consent.  The doctrine of informed consent is based 
on individual self-determination.  
B.  Manifestation of Proxy Informed Consent: Recognizing the Role of the Parents  
 Proxy informed consent is utilized when an individual is considered legally incompetent 
to offer consent on their own behalf.143 Parents providing proxy informed consent for their minor 
children who are incompetent due to age is one of the most common uses of this device.144 
Parents are thus entitled to make medical decisions in the best interest of their children because 
their children are legally and, unless they are mature minors, physically incapable of making 
these decisions for themselves. However, before parents make such decisions they have an 
obligation to obtain and consider the necessary information from the physicians. In this way 
proxy informed consent provides a check on the paternalistic nature of the medical community 
and requires that information be divulged in full so that parents can make informed decisions.  
1. Physician Disclosure Requirements and Parental Obligation to Know  
Parents need access to greater information than a typical patient would need in order to 
provide proxy informed consent for their children. Nonetheless, under current conditions 
surrounding intersex minors, physicians do not give parents the information necessary to make 
informed decisions. The physicians withhold information or provide it in simplified and 
misleading descriptions.145 The physicians justify this under the therapeutic privilege to withhold 
information. However, this exception is narrow and applies only when the physician identifies 
“specific considerations in the individual patient's case” that goes beyond the physician’s 
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decision to withhold a specific medical fact out of the belief it will scare patients, such as 
patients with nervous conditions or other psychological conditions.146 The parents are not the 
patients and the infants are not born with any psychological conditions attributed to their intersex 
condition. There is no evidence that directly links birth with an intersex condition to a 
psychological inability to handle medical information; at least none has been offered by the 
medical community to rationalize their use of this privilege. Even if such a condition existed, this 
would not justify withholding full information from the parents who are providing proxy medical 
consent and therefore are entitled to all available information so that a decision may be made in 
the best interest of the child.  
In addition to divulging the information, physicians have a duty not to mislead the 
parents by displaying an unwarranted sense of urgency or treating the child’s condition as a 
medical emergency if it poses no danger to the life or health of the child. Physicians limit 
parents’ ability to make decisions by forcing them to operate under emergency like conditions. 
The information parents receive about their intersex infants is shrouded in urgency and 
cushioned in euphemisms. This is unnecessary; in most instances intersex conditions do not 
threaten the life or health of the child. The birth of the child is considered a “social emergency,” 
and the medical emergency is based on the cosmetic appearance of the child’s genitalia.147 There 
is no other “medical emergency” allowing for the evasion of informed consent principals based 
on cosmetic appearance of the child, even when the child is visibly physically deformed.148 
Therefore, there is no appreciable reason offered for this particular condition to be treated as a 
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medical emergency. Dr. Money argues that there is a critical time period during which surgery 
should be preformed and sex assignment determined based on the sexual neutrality at birth.149 
However, he offers no empirical evidence that the results and psychological trauma suffered by 
individuals who undergo infant surgery is any less severe than an individual who selects a sex or 
elects whether to have surgery or not later in life. 
The physicians must remember that it is the child who is the patient and not the parent; 
the parent is providing proxy consent for the child. Though the parents may be upset to learn that 
their infant is not perfect, it is the infant with the intersexed condition that is the patient not the 
parents who have an intersexed child. Thus, under the principles of informed consent there is no 
therapeutic privilege to withhold information from the parent. There is a greater duty to inform 
the parents, as the child’s proxy, of all the information. This includes, inter alia, all the risks, 
alternative treatments, and the probability of success if the child does not receive the suggested 
treatment. 
Therefore, if the legal system strictly enforced the requirements of informed consent they 
would find it a violation of informed consent whenever a physician provides less then complete 
information to parents. If the required information is provided, it will reduce a great deal of the 
confusion that parents suffer though and much of the medical isolation and dependency that 
results from a lack of information.   
2. Parental Requirement to Decide in Child’s Best Interest  
Parents inherent ability to provide proxy consent for their minor children stems from the 
belief that the “natural bonds and affection lead parents to act in the best interest of their 
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children.”150 Parents must therefore keep the best interest of their children at the forefront of any 
medical decision. As discussed earlier, when the parents are unable to make medical decisions in 
the best interest of their children, the state can and does intervene.151  
In situations involving the birth of an intersex child parents may be under too much 
emotional strain to render an adequate best interest analysis. To the extent mentioned earlier, 
parents may mourn the loss of their perfect child and as many as fifty percent may be unable to 
ultimately bond fully with their “abnormal” child.152 These reactions contravene the presumption 
that parents are bonded with their child when exercising proxy medical consent. Thus, 
counseling should be offered to parents immediately. This will assist them in overcoming the 
shock and any feelings of loss they may have to promote the parent child bond. The counselor 
will also be able to determine if the parents are ultimately unable to accept the child, or remain in 
an emotional state that interferes with their ability to engage in adequate best interest analysis 
regarding their intersex child. If the counselor finds they are not currently capable of providing 
best interest informed consent decisions for the child, the state has the ability to intervene and 
protect the child from potential harm. A guardian ad litem can be appointed to make these 
determinations for as long as the parent remains incapable of fulfilling this responsibility.153 
C.  Manifestation of Informed Consent Best Interest Analysis: Acknowledging Rights and  
      Recognizing Personal Interests of Minors 
 
 As society continues to recognize more constitutional rights for minors they gain a 
stronger hold on individual self-determination. Particularly significant for intersex minors, 
Justice O’Connor pointed out that “a child, in common with adults, has a liberty interest in not 
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being confined unnecessarily for medical treatment.”154 Therefore, if the benefits of surgeries 
performed on intersex genitalia are primarily cosmetic, minors have a significant liberty interest 
in not being confined for these treatments unless they are capable of providing at least some 
input in the decision.  
 Currently, sex assignment surgery is recommended before the child reaches the age of 
two.155 This is based on the premise that if they are performed early enough the sex and gender 
of the child can be shaped by the gender of rearing.156 This not only ignores the individual self-
determination of the intersex minor, but is a direct assault aimed at eroding it away.  Therefore, a 
wait and see approach that places the highest level of importance on which sex the child 
identifies with is more in line with a best interest and individual self-determination of the child. 
This will also prevent cases where children have rejected assigned genders but have already 
undergone surgery. If the child has already undergone surgery, reassigning a sex is an onerous 
task.157  
 Permitting children to age will allow parent to see if they identify with one sex or 
another. Counseling will play a crucial component. They will be able to smooth the progress of 
children as they develop and find their place in the world. The psychologist will also be able to 
assist the parents in determining which sex their child identifies with, and determining when and 
if a sex assignment surgery is in the best interest of their child. For some children this could 
come before puberty to prevent mixed hormonal signals. For other children it may be their best 
interest to never have a genital surgery.  This takes the decision away from a medical bright line 
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rule and creates an individual evaluation based on each child’s individual needs and 
circumstances. 
 Keeping with this model also protects intersex minors’ right to individual self-
determination on another level. By keeping the family in counseling the motives of the parent 
can be assessed. As discussed above, the parents may be suffering from emotional strain or 
shock from the birth or news of their intersex minor; however, they may also have conflicting 
interest from their child. If parents have difficulty considering that the interests of their child may 
evolve and grow over time with the child, it may be difficult for the parent to fully consider 
whether surgery is in the best interest of the child.158 For instance, a normalization surgery may 
seem more beneficial while the child is an adolescent, as they may feel embarrassed particularly 
during gym class at school. However, if the surgery comes with the loss of sexual sensation it 
may not be in the child’s best interest when the child becomes an adult and would prefer normal 
sexual sensation. In addition, as discussed above, some parents may have cultural conflicts that 
lead them toward surgery regardless of the child’s interest.159 These conflicts can be discovered 
during the long term counseling. If the parents have interests that sufficiently conflict with those 
of the child, the state has the ability to intervene and protect the child from potential harm.160 A 
guardian ad litem can be appointed to represent the interest of the child, thereby preserving the 
child’s individual self-determination and assuring that the child’s best interest is truly 
accomplished through the rules of informed consent.   
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CONCLUSION 
Though existing informed consent rules are underutilized and improperly applied, strict 
adherence to the rules of informed consent can protect the rights of individuals born with 
intersex conditions. The consequences of infant genital surgery can be significant both during 
childhood and once the child reaches adulthood. The surgery can result is scarring, loss of sexual 
sensation, and emotional difficulties, including feelings of shame and isolation resulting from the 
secrecy. In addition, if the assigned sex is rejected the necessary tissue to assign the other gender 
has already been removed.  
Informed consent requires doctors to provide parents with all the necessary information 
to make informed decisions in the best interest of the child. Instead, parents are given shady 
information expressed in terms of urgency at a time when they are in shock and under emotional 
strain. Additionally, the parents may have interests that directly conflict with those of the child.  
This does not meet the standard for granting informed consent on behalf of a child. Instead, it 
represents the social trepidation of the child’s condition and the rush to correct the problem 
without regard to any of the principles of informed consent, and a complete disregard for the idea 
of individual self-determination.  
In an effort to stabilize the situation and protect the interest of this minority group the 
legal system should insist on the strict enforcement of all the principles of best interest informed 
consent. The parents and the child should undergo years of therapy to understand the situation. 
The therapy can identify conflicts, determine when, and if, surgery is in the child’s best interest, 
as well as what sex the child identifies with. Parents should be given the tools to give actual 
informed consent that is truly in the best interest of the child.  
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The 1969 medical mentality that the infants are “freaks, misfits, curiosities, rejected by 
society” should be left behind as a remnant of history. A time when society held the birth of a 
child with a intersex condition as a “social emergency” to be treated with trepidation and 
urgency. Social trepidation and deceptive research from decades long past ought not control the 
decision of what is in a child’s best interest. For a society with institutional underpinnings so 
strongly established in individual self-determination to take the right of self-determination away 
from an entire group out of fear of their birth is unacceptable.  Informed consent is the very 
embodiment of an individual’s right to self-determination; if the rules do not apply to these 
individuals then society has judged them less then full citizens by the condition of their birth. 
